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Theory and practice of falsified elections1 
Oleg Kapustenko2 
Statistical Institute for Democracy 
Abstract: An analysis of falsified election results is presented. A model of the falsification process is 
proposed and simulations are performed. The model fits well the data of the parliamentary elections 
in Russia on December 4, 2011. It is shown that the "noise" of false votes is well separated from the 
fair “signal”, which can be extracted with high statistical accuracy (less than l%) allowing 
quantitative reconstruction of the falsification patterns. 
Introduction 
Statistical analyses of the Russian elections show anomalous effects, as evidenced by numerous 
calculations [1-2]. The purpose of this article is the development of a model of election falsification 
and its simulation, as well as development of a methodology of data analysis which is able to isolate 
the "noise" bogus votes and obtain the "signal" of the actual election results. 
Before start let’s clarify the terminology an some specific of Russian vo. The electorate is all 
peoples, which are valid or entitled or eligible to vote. The voters or voted peoples are part of the 
electorate, which exercised their rights to vote. Their fraction relatively to the electorate is turnout or 
attendance. The precinct or the polling station (also called UIK according to the Russian acronym 
УИК) is atomic local unit, which is organized specially for elections. On average, a thousand of 
citizens can vote on a typical polling station and their total number is nearly 100,000. The precincts 
are not related to the administrative-territorial division of the country; they are organized and 
managed by the Central Election Commission (CEC) of the Russian Federation (CEC)3. 
Theory 
Practice shows that for elections without fraud, the distribution of voter turnout, as well as votes for 
candidates, in electoral precincts is close to a normal distribution; this is the "pure fair signal" (see 
Fig. 1). This is a critical assumption and its accurate test goes beyond the scope of this 
article. However, qualitatively and intuitively it can be assumed that elections should obey the law of 
large numbers. The vote of each citizen is an independent, random value with negligible effect on the 
final result. According to the central limit theorem, the mean of a large number of such random 
values should be normally distributed; all roads lead to a Gaussian. In the case of falsification of 
almost all types this distribution of votes is inevitably altered. In most cases the votes of "dead souls" 
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are added for the Big Candidate (BC). Regardless of the mechanism of falsification this leads to the 
following two effects: 
1. Fictitious increase in votes for the BC; 
2. Fictitious increase in voter turnout. 
It is crucial that these phenomena are 100% correlated with each other, so that the effect is seen 
immediately in the statistical distributions of votes per precinct. 
Simulation. D.Agafontsev made the first simulations to assess the rigging of the parliamentary 
elections in Russia, December 4, 2011 [3]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fractional voter turnout per precinct in parliamentary (PAR) and presidential (PRE and 
stage) elections in different countries. Data from Sergey Shpilkin [9].  
 
In this paper a simple model of election falsification is proposed. Let’s assume that elections take 
place at N polling stations with false votes added at a fraction fN of the polling stations, f ∈ [0,1]. A 
normal distribution of voters per polling station is expected: 
V(W) = exp [-0.5(W-WMEAN)2/σ2W]     (1) 
where WMEAN and σW  are the average voter turnout and its standard deviation respectively. In a 
particular polling station, the turnout is W’, from distribution (1). Assuming no theft of votes the only 
gap to assign additional false votes for the BC is in the range [W ', 1] with some false vote 
probability function: 
WFALSE = F(W)  W ∈ [W’,1].     (2) 
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A set of simulations was carried out in order to demonstrate the effects of this model. The parameters 
used are (percentages are relative to the electorate in the precinct): normal turnout WMEAN= 
60% and σ= 10%; fraud probability f = 0.5; real support for the BC is 40% with a standard deviation 
4% scaled from that of the turnout for simplicity. A total sample of 80,000 precincts was simulated 
with a Monte Carlo technique. As a starting point, the turnout W’ was randomly chosen according to 
(1) for each precinct. False votes were then added in the range [W',1], with probability f, using 
different functions of (2). As can be seen from Fig. 2 (left), any injection of false votes spreads the 
votes from the normal peak to its right tail (a linearly descending “noisy generator” function (2) was 
used). 
The probability function (2) is determined by the circumstances, i.e. the possible vote falsification 
mechanisms. It can be modest (flat or decreasing function), medium (growing), or even shamelessly 
large and aggressive (left exponential tail of 100%) or more realistically a combination of these (see 
Fig. 2, right). A priori, one can assume that the modest regime with a decreasing function (2) takes 
place in semi-democratic countries: the more falsification, the harder it is to implement under the 
pressure of public observers in particular and society in general. However, the specific form of the 
function can only be identified by analyzing real data, which is done in the next section. 
  
 
Figure 2. Left: simulated frequency distributions of votes per precinct (precinct) in elections without 
false votes (black and green histograms for the BC and all others, respectively) and with linearly 
decreasing injection of false votes (red curve). Right: the influence of weak (black), medium (red) 
and strong (green) falsification for the BC.  
 
We also note an important fact: the higher the turnout, the less opportunity for falsification due to 
narrowing of the allowed [W',1] gap! Thus, the tactic of boycotting the elections plays to the 
advantage of the BC. 
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The opposition candidate (OC). The violation of a normal distribution for the OC could take place 
by the stealing of votes, e.g. fake voting protocols in precincts. In this case a left tail should be 
observed for the OC, which is a mirror opposite to the right tail of the BC distribution in the case of a 
falsified election. 
False votes in elections can be considered as background (noise), which should be isolated and cut 
off from the signal of fair votes.  
Thus, summarizing the above, the simulation shows that injection of votes for the BC generates right 
tails in the distribution of votes, or voter turnout, per precinct, and stealing of votes for the OC gives 
the opposite effect. The sizes and shapes of the tails depend on the specific circumstances in 
the elections.  
Analysis of real data 
The results of the parliamentary elections in Russia, December 4, 2011, were analyzed. The data 
includes protocols from 95,073 precincts with 109,430,459 voters. One needs to emphasize that votes 
were normalized to the electorate, i.e. the list of eligible voters plus those eligible to vote outside 
their precincts, the so-called absentee ballots. Normalization to the number of voters introduces a 
systematic error in the case of false votes, which systematically shifts the total number of votes. 
The distributions of votes per precinct for the state party "Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia), here 
called the EdRo, and for all other parties (including invalid ones) are shown in Fig. 3. A significant 
right tail is observed for the EdRo as well as for the turnout, while the peak for the other parties is 
almost normally distributed.  
 
 
Figure 3. Votes for the EdRo (red) and the others (black) and the turnout (green) as fractions of the 
electorate in linear (left) and logarithmic (right) scales. 
 
Fit of false tail 
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At this stage it is necessary to find a theoretical model that describes satisfactorily the right tail of the 
EdRo curve (red line in Fig. 3.). The exponential, Landau, and RooNovosibirsk[4] distributions give 
qualitatively close, but quantitatively poor fits. The best approximation is obtained using the Extreme 
Value Type II distribution, proposed in 1927 by French mathematician Maurice Fréchet [10]: 
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The result is shown in Fig. 4. As can be seen, the model fits the data quite well in the main middle 
range, while it’s clear that some special mechanisms are contributing at higher turnout (>70%). The 
results of this fit allow us to separate the false votes modeled by the Frechet curve (purple line in 
Fig. 4) from the fair votes localized as a Gaussian peak (red line in Fig. 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The fit of the election results for the EdRo in linear (left) and logarithmic (right) scales 
with the fair Gaussian signal (red dotted line) and falsified noise modeled by a Frechet curve (purple 
line). The full model (blue line) fits reasonably the data (black dots). 
 
A recalculation of election votes based on the result of the fit is presented in the Table 1. 
The fit on the logarithmic scale (Fig. 4 right) shows that the Gaussian curve of fair votes ends at a 
turnout of ~30%. This means that most precincts above this threshold are cheating ones, excluding a 
small number of some specific, unusual cases.  
The fit result gives ~39% for the true percentage of votes for the EdRo, which is consistent to within 
a few percent of other estimates based on different approaches [5].  
Oleg Kapustenko  Theory and practice of falsified elections 
6 
 
The opposition. The fit of the votes for the non-EdRo parties is shown in Fig.5. It was found that the 
“broadened” Gaussian signal on exponential pedestal right slope fits well the data except ranges at 
both edges of the scale. The non-EdRo peak is actually a sum of different Gaussians with different 
sigmas (votes for different parties), what’s why the parameter of broadness B was introduced to 
imitate the imperfectness of integral peak (Fig.5 zoom at left picture) and was fit to B=1.2%. The fit 
gives 31.44 ± 0.03% of the electorate voting for the non-EdRo parties, using a real turnout of 50.2%, 
corresponding to 62.4 % of the votes cast, which is consistent with the result 60,4% based on the fit 
of the distribution of votes for the EdRo (see Table 1). The consistency of the results obtained in two 
different ways validates the approach used. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the election results with and without the "noise" in the model described.  
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Citizens, millions The ratio of false votes,% 
All eligible voters (electorate) 
109,4 
Relative to all electorate 9,8% 
False (bogus) votes 
10,7 
Relative to number who voted 
including false votes 16,3% 
Number who voted   Precincts (UIKs) 
  - Including false votes 65,7 Cheating UIKs,% of all UIKs 72,0% 
  - Excluding false votes 55,0 The average ratio of false 
votes for the EdRo, % of the 
electorate 
22,5% 
Number who voted for the EdRo 
  - Including false votes 32,3 Votes for the EdRo,% of voted 
  - Excluding false votes 21,6 Including false votes 49,3% 
All other votes 33,2 Excluding false votes 39,4% 
Turnout of the entire electorate, % Votes for all others, % of voted 
  - Including false votes 60,0% Including false votes 50,6% 
  - Excluding false votes 50,2%  Excluding false votes 60,4% 
 
Turnout dependence. The scatter plots of turnout vs. party votes (see Fig.6) are another good way to 
see the effects discussed. Two “comet tails” are clearly visible on the plots, but the tail of the EdRo 
comet is directed toward 100% of votes, while the other tail drops to zero votes. This signature is 
totally consistent with the assumption of injection and theft of votes. 
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Figure 5. A fit of all other votes excluding those for the EdRo. The “broadened” Gaussian model 
used is shown in the zoom of the right picture, the parameter of broadness was fit to B=1.2%. 
 
 
Figure 6. The turnout vs. party votes scatter plots for the EdRo (left) and all others (right). Shares of 
votes on the Y axis are relative to the electorate, which is also counted on the Z axis. 
 
The evolution of voting distributions as the turnout increases is shown in Fig. 7. It is obvious that the 
shape of the voting distribution depends dramatically on the turnout. The more polling stations with a 
large turnout are taken into account, the stronger grows the right tail of the EdRo and the left tail of 
the all other votes. This fits perfectly with the assumption of falsified elections. 
Fraud mechanisms.  In Russia each citizen is assigned by residence location to vote at particular 
polling station. However, (s)he may vote on another precinct, previously asked for and received the 
so-called absentee ballot (2.5% of electorate at this election). In addition, (s)he can vote in advance 
(ahead) or outside the polling station on election day(1.5%). The last option is called the voting at 
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home, as it is usually provided for the sick and disabled persons to whom the special mobile ballot 
boxes are delivered from the assigned polling station (0.2%). These three options are potential 
channels of the direct injection of votes, so-called ballot stuffing, and subjects to study. 
 
 
Figure 7. The voting distributions for the EdRo (left) and all others (right) for low (<30%, black), 
middle (30-60%, red) and high (>60%, green) turnouts. Vote fractions on X axis are relative to the 
electorate. 
 
The distributions of votes for these categories are shown in Fig. 8. All these distributions have shapes 
close to the main trends shown in Fig. 3. The slight difference is that the mean value for all three 
kinds of votes for the EdRo is 36.1% of the electorate, which is 6.5% bigger than the final total result 
of 27% for the EdRo, which corresponds to the 0.3 million of votes. The other parties have 29.2% of 
these votes, which is 1.1% less than the final total value of 30.3% (the 0.05 million votes). 
Nevertheless, these differences are small in comparison with the 10.7 million false votes determined 
from the fit. Therefore, the ballot stuffing and/or the false reporting of the ballot results at precincts 
are the only ways to generate such a significant amount of false votes. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Distributions of votes from absentee ballots (left); home voters (middle), and advance 
votes for the EdRo (blue) and all others (red). Vote fractions on the Y axis are relative to the 
electorate. 
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The KOIBs. The systems of automated processing of ballots (KOIB, according to the Russian 
acronym КОИБ) are installed at some of the polling stations4 (see Fig.9, left). Only one bulletin at a 
time can be thrown into the KOIB, making it difficult to ballot stuffing. And the system scans the 
ballot inserted counting the final results automatically without human intervention. It means that both 
main falsification channels of the election are hampered at the polling stations equipped by the 
KOIB. We built the distributions of votes separately on polling stations equipped and not equipped 
with the KOIB. The total statistics covers 58 regions: 3189 KOIB-equipped polling stations with 5.75 
million citizens entitled to vote5 versus 60,862 polling stations with 71.85 million of voters without 
the KOIBs. Although these groups differ in magnitude, the sample for automated polling stations 
covering 5.26% of the electorate is not negligible. The normalized shapes of distributions obtained 
are shown in Fig.10 (right). 
 
   
Figure 9. The KOIB, which is electronic ballot box6 (left) and the votes at polling equipped and not 
equipped with the KOIBs. 
 
The shapes are dramatically different for the EdRo votes with a huge right tail for the polling stations 
without KOIBs perfectly consistent with the assumption of ballot stuffing. The shapes for the other 
parties also differ significantly: main right shift and right tail has appeared for the polling station 
without KOIBs, which could be explained by the theft of the votes. 
Regional effects. Although further detailed analysis of the effects discussed here is potentially 
possible, probing one step down to regional level, it is far beyond the scope of this work. Here we 
will give one example which, nevertheless, indicates huge regional differences in the results of the 
elections. The results of voting in Moscow are shown in Fig. 10 (left). We assume that the second 
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peak of the EdRo distribution (observed also by others, e.g. [6]) cannot be explained by anything 
other than execution of the plan, publicly claimed by the EdRo before the election, to obtain more 
than half the votes. A fit shows (see Fig. 10, right) that authorities at almost one third of precincts 
(~1100 from a total of 3373) followed this order. Other detailed effects can also be investigated, e.g. 
Peaks around “nice numbers” of voting results (60%, 75%, 80%, etc.) have also been observed (see 
Fig. 11, right). Finally, significant differences are revealed between different groups of citizens with 
the most significant gap between urban and rural votes. For details we refer the reader to numerous 
publications [1]. 
 
Figure 10. The Moscow votes (left) and fit of the second peak in the EdRo distribution (right).  
 
The distribution of the tail. It is an interesting fact that the tail of false votes is described by the 
Frechet, extreme value, distribution (3) with the following parameters: 
a = 0.93 ± 0.02, b = 20.4 ± 0.3      (4) 
As the name implies, the distribution is intended to describe the behavior of the maximum value of a 
random variable, for example, the maximum amount of rainfall in one day for a year [7]. If a set of 
random numbers is generated, the maximal number in the sample follows a Frechet distribution. The 
shape of the distribution depends crucially on the size N of the sample. For N = 1, the Frechet 
distribution is identical to the distribution of the random variable itself. With increasing sample size 
the maximal value is more and more likely to be at the upper boundary of the allowed range. In our 
case the maximum value is 100% voter turnout. The injection of false votes can be treated as virtual 
sampling of false votes introduced by precinct authorities. The size of this sample is limited by the 
amount of external pressure applied to the precincts by public control over their work (honest 
members of precincts; electoral observers, etc.). Thus, it appears that the Frechet distribution has 
found another use in real processes, in the analysis of falsified elections. 
Finally, the scientific questions discussed have already moved to political posters (see Fig. 10). 
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Figure 10. Protest against unfair elections, 10 December 2011, Moscow [8-9]. Phrases in the posters 
are “For the normal distribution” (left) and “In Gauss we trust!” 
 
Conclusion 
The method employed in this article demonstrates the power of statistical analysis applied to election 
results from individual precincts. It is shown that the injection and theft of votes distorts their 
distributions. Despite fraud violating the election results, a statistical analysis is able to determine and 
cut off the tails of fraudulent votes and, ultimately, to separate the wheat from the chaff or flies from 
the cutlets (the Russian proverb with the same meaning). 
The analysis shows that ~10 million of false votes have been added for the EdRo, which 
accounted for ~10% increase to the final results. Fraud took place at ~70% of the polling 
stations with average value of added false votes of 20% of the electorate. 
The method is confirmed both theoretically (simulation) and experimentally. The model fits well the 
data, and the noise is separated from the signal with a high level of statistical accuracy (error less 
than 1%). Interestingly the fake votes obey the extreme value type II distribution of Frechet, showing 
that this distribution is suitable for the analysis of “noisy” elections. 
Thus, access to voting data from individual precincts makes faking results in such a way as to be 
invisible in statistical analyses almost impossible; full control of all precincts would be required to 
achieve this, and this is not the case in normal elections. Alas, a more realistic way to hide election 
fraud is to deny access to detailed voting data and to declare only the final results. 
The data used and scripts developed to obtained the result presented here can download from 
the Google docs [10]. 
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